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Labour Market Reforms and Polarization in Korea
Raymond K.H. Chan*

Abstract
From the early 1990s the South Korean government launched a
series of structural reforms to liberalize and deregulate the economy
and labour market, in line with its globalization strategy.
Particularly after the financial crisis, flexible labour market reform
was one of the major initiatives to keep the Korean economy
competitive in the global market. This paper describes the rationale
for flexible labour market reforms in Korea from the early 1990s,
evaluates their impacts on labour market polarization, and assesses
the policy responses adopted by Kim Dae-jung and the current Roh
Moo-hyun governments. It is argued that the flexible labour market
reform is rather limited in its scale, due to strong opposition from
unions and employees for different reasons, and the burden is
disproportionately shouldered by the non-standard workers. As a
result, a dual and segmented dual labour market has been formed.
Greater protection to the non-standard workers is required to
remedy the situation, considering that such reforms are necessary
for Korea’s economy in the future.

Globalization and Flexible Labour Market Reform
Globalization affects employment in developed as well as in
developing countries. In a global market, the structure of the
production and the companies involved is more flexible and
constantly changing. Globalization does not give birth to flexible
forms of work, but it contributes to their development through the
national and international network enterprises, the need to make the
employment structure flexible enough to fit this form of production,
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and the desire to remain competitive, which are the direct and
indirect results of globalization. In an increasingly competitive
economic environment, enterprises have sought more flexible and
innovative forms of organization and production to heighten economic
efficiency in response to technological change and consumer
preferences in quality, service, and variety (ILO, 1998, 2000).
To accommodate this degree of flexibility, a wide variety of
employment structures are desirable. Basically, the more rigid form
of full-time, fixed-term contract and long-term employment is
eliminated and replaced by a diverse pool of workers, including
part-time, temporary, and self-employed workers. International
statistics on work have shown this development. This trend is
accompanied by the increasing individualization of labour conditions
and contracts, in contrast to collective bargaining and general
working conditions.
The causes of labour market rigidity are numerous, including
discouragement of hiring due to restrictive labour legislation, high
statutory minimum wage, high social contributions and taxation,
rigid wage levels set by collective bargaining, inadequate training
and education systems, passive labour market policy, and overly
generous income substitution benefits that discourage work (Sarfati,
1999). Rigid labour regulations, working conditions, and terms of
employment also act as disincentives to staff recruitment and hence
unemployment (ILO, 1998). Such restrictions include maximum
working hours, overtime and overtime pay, leave, and paid holidays.
While trade unions argue for more protection, some employers seek
to modify these regulations to make the labour market less rigid.
There are several aspects of flexibility (Confederation of British
Industry, 1997: 2-3):
1. Numerical flexibility: adjustment of the number of employees to
meet changing demand and competitive conditions (e.g.
downsizing).
2. Flexible working patterns: varying the hours of work (e.g.,
part-time work, shift work, and annualized hours) and hence the
2

types of employment contract (e.g., fixed term and seasonal
contracts).
3. Skills/functional flexibility: highly skilled and competent workers
and free movement of employees between tasks due to flexible
skills and an absence of demarcation lines.
4. Wage flexibility: adjustment of wages to correspond to changing
economic conditions and to company and individual performance.
5. Geographical mobility: the ability of employees to move freely
between different regions.
Globalization and the Reforms in South Korea before the
Financial Crisis
Since the early 1990s South Korea has been part of the general
movement toward a more flexible labour market. Since 1987, there
have been changes in the highly centralized and regulated economic
and labour market structure. The Kim Young-sam government
(1993-98) launched liberalization and internationalization policies.
Maintaining the competitiveness of Korean products in the global
market became a more and more difficult task partly due to wage
hikes. The increased reliance on exports made products vulnerable to
the fluctuations of the international market (for example, the
dropping price of semi-conductors before the financial crisis).
Employers are increasingly constrained by volatile product market
competition and are also burdened by rigid rules and high wages in
internal labour markets (Lee, 2000, p. 4). There have been calls to
reform the enterprises and the labour market structure to meet these
demands. Kim Young-sam attempted to apply market principles to
the labour market to make it more flexible (Kim, 2000; Y.H. Lee,
2000). Alternative employment patterns and types, such as leased
labour, contract labour, and part-time work, were not popular
(KOILAF, 1998).
Since there were no regulations concerning redundancy dismissal,
flexible labour hours, and labour lease systems, which are features of
a flexible labour market, the market and its regulators were criticized

3

for being unrealistic and rigid in regulating the terms of employment
(such as working hours, leave, allowances, and retirement pay).
The Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform was
formed in May 1996, with the aim of relaxing the labour regulations.
The proposed revision of the Labor Standards Act on layoff was
passed by the National Assembly in March 1997, but was boycotted
by the opposition party. The governing party had to halt the
provision of layoff for two years to give the government more time
to lobby support. However, the introduction of a system of flexible
working hours was adopted, which allow the calculation to be based
on a bi-weekly or monthly basis.
To smooth the reforms, the Employment Insurance System was
enacted in 1993 and implemented in 1995. The System has the dual
role of stabilizing employment while, at the same time, smoothing
the labour adjustment process when unemployment and
reemployment are necessary.
Pushing Flexible Labour Market Reform since the Financial
Crisis
Changes in Employment Status
The Korean financial crisis occurred in November 1997 and brought
the positive trajectory of economic development to a sudden and
unexpected halt. As outlined by the Ministry of Finance and
Economy (1999), the first phase of the reforms for recovery (i.e.,
from December 1997 to April 1998) was to introduce the corporate
restructuring and flexible labour principle, establish the Tripartite
Commission, and legislate the layoff provisions. The second phase,
from May 1998 to June 1998, witnessed the liberalization of foreign
investors’ mergers and acquisition of local companies, real estate,
and equity ownership of private Korean enterprises. The third phase,
from July 1998 to February 1999, was characterized by massive
corporate merging and restructuring. The most significant social
impacts of the crisis were to increase unemployment and decrease
income in the process of corporate and employment restructuring.
4

With agreement from the trade unions, the clause on layoffs in the
Labor Standards Act was formally implemented in February 1998,
though layoffs could only be permitted under the following
conditions: 1) urgent managerial needs, including transfer,
acquisition, and merger of business to avoid financial difficulties; 2)
employers should make every effort to avoid dismissal of workers
and if dismissal occurs, a fair and rational standard should be in
place; 3) sincere consultation with the trade union and 60 days,
advance notice (Article 31, Labor Standards Act).
Another strategy to make the labour market more flexible was to
legalize the labour dispatch system. The ‘Act Relating to Protection,
etc, for Dispatched Workers’ was enacted in 1998; it allowed the use
of a “dispatched worker” in Korea for up to two years in 26
occupations deemed to require specialized knowledge, skills, and
experience. The employment could be extended for another year if
agreed upon by both parties.
Large enterprises were more ready to make good use of
subcontracting to shift their burdens, due to excessive wage hikes, to
subcontracted small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), resulting
in the transition of jobs in SMEs to non-regular ones (Labor Today,
Issue No.336 - April 13, 2006). The KCTU (1999) argued that the
government and employers have deliberately enforced labour market
flexibility: “Employers have sought to suppress the increase in
regular employment and resorted to expansion of part-time
employment in their pursuit for labour cost savings, flexible
employment adjustment, and elastic response to shifts in the
business demand”.
Together with the rapid expansion of public projects, which provided
mainly temporary and daily work, the number of irregular or
non-standard (which mainly refers to temporary and daily) workers
increased. By 1999, the irregular workers (simply defined as a total
of temporary and daily workers) accounted for more than 50 per cent
of the paid workforce (though the share reduced to less than half from
2003) (Table 1).
5

Nevertheless, there were some debates on the definition of
non-standard (or irregular, atypical workers) from around 1999,
when non-standard workers as represented by temporary and daily
workers began to take up more than half of the waged workers (Ahn,
2004). The definition of most-frequently referred terms: regular vs
irregular workers (comprised of temporary and daily workers)
adopted in the Economically Active Population Survey are as follows,
Regular workers – workers with employment contracts for 1
year or longer’ and / or ‘workers who have worked for one
year or longer and are entitled to fringe benefits such as
legal retirement allowances and bonuses’;
Temporary workers – ‘workers with employment contracts for
longer than one month but shorter than one year’;
Daily workers – ‘those workers who are not regular or temporary
workers, and with employment contracts for less than one
month’.
Table 1: Waged workers by employment status, 1990 – 2005 (%)
Wage &
Regular
Temporary
salary workers
employees
employees
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

54.2
55.5
57.4
58.9
57.9
58.1
56.8
54.3
53.1
48.4
47.9
49.2
48.4
50.5
51.2
52.1

Source: Ministry of Labor Website
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29.0
28.7
27.7
26.7
27.8
27.9
29.6
31.6
32.9
33.6
34.5
34.6
34.5
34.7
34.1
33.3

Daily
workers
16.8
15.7
14.9
14.4
14.3
14.0
13.6
14.1
14.0
18.0
17.6
16.2
17.2
14.8
14.7
14.6

The definitions adopted are rather loosely defined and may not be
able to reflect the workers’ status and their experience in labour
market. Therefore, a Supplementary Economically Active Population
Survey (SEAPS) was conducted annually to collect further data (the
first survey was in August 2000). The survey asks more questions to
clarify the employment status, such as starting date, existence of an
employment contract with period, possibility of renewal, full-time or
part-time, expected duration of the current employment, coverage of
social insurance systems, and entitlement of fringe benefits.
Table 2: Employment by types, 2000 - 2003 (%)
Employed workers
2000

2001

2002

2003

Workers without fixed term contract
1. continuing employment, possible

71.3

73.0

67.2

70.1

Workers without fixed term contract, continuing employment impossible and the
expected duration
2. > 3 years
-0.5
0.2
0.6
3. 1 – 3 years
2.3
1.7
1.1
1.8
4. < 1 year
-1.7
1.3
1.3
Sub-total
2.3
3.9
2.6
3.7
Workers with fixed term contract, continuing employment possible and the duration
of contract
5. > 3 years
-0.4
0.5
0.6
6. 1 – 3 years
3.4
1.7
1.6
2.6
7. 1 year
-1.1
1.5
2.6
8. < 1 year
3.4
1.7
1.6
2.6
Sub-total
6.8
4.9
5.2
8.4
Workers with fixed term contract, continuing employment impossible, and the
duration of contract
9. > 3 years
-0.0
0.0
10. 1 – 3 years
-0.1
0.1
11. 1 year
3.8
0.1
0.1
12. < 1 year
-3.9
3.7
Sub-total
3.8
4.1
3.9

0.1
0.2
0.2
5.4
5.9

13. part-time workers
4.5
4.3
4.0
4.6
14. dispatched workers
0.9
0.9
0.7
0.7
15. temporary agency workers
1.7
2.1
2.3
2.3
16. independent contractors
4.3
5.7
5.3
3.9
17. on-call / daily workers
7.9
2.2
2.9
4.2
18. tele-workers / home-based workers
1.1
1.6
1.3
0.9
Sub-total
20.4
16.8
16.5
16.6
Sources: Supplementary Economically Active Population Survey, various years
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As reflected by the SEAPS from 2000 to 2003 (Table 2), most of the
workers belong to the category of waged earners without fixed term
contract but with possibility of continuing employment, though the
percentage is declining. That might reflect the traditional
employment structure in Korea. The percentage of workers with
fixed term contract is increasing (i.e. 10.6% to 14.3%). In 2003,
among the fixed term contract workers, 56% are with less than 1
year contract; and 41.3% of them expected their contract not to be
renewed. The share of all other forms of non-standard work reduced
from 20.4% to 18.6% in the period.
The latest SEAPS, conducted in August 2005, provides us the most
updated information on employment status. Waged workers with a
fixed term contract continued to increase and reached 18.2% of the
total (17.1% in 2004). Among them, 56.7% had a less than one year
contract, though more than half (i.e. 55.4%) of the fixed term
contract workers have had their contract renewed. Part-time workers
increased to 7.0% of total waged workers.
The increase in fixed term contracts is not only due to the economic
recession in 2003 and 2004, but also seems to be attributable to the
structural shift in the labour market – implying that companies are
increasingly preferring non-standard workers for greater ease in
wage or employment adjustment. Another reason is more companies
are putting in place a trial period before turning the workers into
standard positions. According to the Workplace Panel Study by the
Korea Labor Institute (KLI) in 2002, 65% of the responding
workplaces have utilized nonstandard work, and the main reasons
were more flexibility of employment (30.3%) and reduction of
labour costs (32.1%) (Ahn, 2004: 16).
Though the data collected from the EAPS and SEAPS seemed not
that alarming, further analysis of the data clearly demonstrates a
worrying trend of labour market segmentation.
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Inequality – Women’s Employment
Compared to the overall distribution, female waged workers have a
higher percentage of workers as temporary and daily workers (see
Table 3).
Table 3: Employment by status for female
waged workers
Female
Regular
Year
waged workers
employees
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

5397
5609
5857
5970
6237
6391

1679 (31.1)
1861 (33.2)
1968 (33.6)
2109 (35.3)
2269 (36.4)
2439 (38.2)

Unit: 1,000 persons / % of total
Temporary
Daily
employees
workers
2496 (46.2)
2589 (46.2)
2682 (45.8)
2826 (47.3)
2869 (46.0)
2874 (45.0)

1222 (22.6)
1159 (20.7)
1207 (20.6)
1036 (17.4)
1079 (17.3)
1079 (16.9)

Source: Economically Active Population Survey, various years

Wage Gap
The wage gap between the standard and the non-standard workers is
widening in recent years. According to the SEAPS in August 2005,
the hourly wages of wage-earners was KRW 9,263 for regular
jobs and KRW 6,526 for non-regular jobs. The hourly rate of
non-regular jobs was only 70.5% of the regular jobs, compared
to 73.5% in 2004.
Among them, the non-regular workers at small or medium-sized
businesses amounted to only 42.9% of that of regular workers at
large enterprises. Compared to 2004’s growth rate, the hourly
wage of regular workers was 5.8% compared to those of
non-regular workers at a mere 1.3%. After adjusting the impacts of
factors such as age, experience, education and other attributes,
irregular workers are paid approximately 20% to 27% less than a
regular worker receives (Jones, 2005: 5).
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Table 4: Wage and wage growth rate for regular and
non-regular workers, 2000 - 2004
Unit: in 1000 KRW
Waged workers
Aug 2000 Aug 2001 Aug 2002 Aug 2003 Aug 2004
Regular
1,527
1,649 (8.0) 1,769 (7.3) 1,958 (10.7) 2,036 (4.0)
Temporary / daily
783
843 (7.6)
901 (7.0)
952 (5.6)
989 (4.0)
Wage gap (%)
51.3
51.1
51.0
48.6
48.6
Source: Hwang & Jeong, 2005: Table 12

Fringe Benefit & Social Insurance Coverage
It was found that, in 2003, longer-term contract employees with
continuing employment possible enjoyed the highest
participation rate, and lower participation rate among those with
shorter contract with renewal impossible, and most forms of
non-standard employment (Table 5).
Table 5: Coverage of social insurance by types of employment (%)
Employed workers
None
EI
HI
NP

All

Workers without fixed term contract
1. continuing employment, possible 24.6

58.7

1.2

1.1

0.1

Workers without fixed term contract, continuing employment impossible and the
expected duration
2. > 3 years
65.2
3.4
2.2
0.0
23.6
3. 1 – 3 years
77.8
3.2
2.0
0.8
12.7
4. < 1 year
83.1
2.1
2.1
0.0
10.1
Workers with fixed term contract, continuing employment possible and the duration
of contract
5. > 3 years
2.2
1.1
1.1
0.0
84.4
6. 1 – 3 years
7.6
0.0
1.4
0.0
84.1
7. 1 year
2.7
0.3
1.6
0.8
23.7
8. < 1 year
65.9
2.2
1.6
0.8
23.7
Workers with fixed term contract, continuing employment impossible, and the
duration of contract
9. > 3 years
10.0
0.0
10.0
0.0
10. 1 – 3 years
3.8
0.0
3.8
0.0
11. 1 year
9.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
12. < 1 year
85.5
1.0
0.9
0.0
13. part-time workers
95.7
0.0
0.6
0.0
14. dispatched workers
39.4
3.2
3.2
0.0
15. temporary agency workers
23.0
1.9
13.4
0.0
16. independent contractors
72.6
1.8
2.5
0.2
17. on-call / daily workers
98.0
1.7
0.2
0.0
18. tele-workers / home-based workers 93.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
Source: Supplementary Survey of the Economically Active Population, 2003
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60.0
73.1
72.7
10.0
1.4
50.0
51.6
18.5
0.0
6.6

From the SEAPS – 2005, unequal treatment among those with fixed
term contract and daily workers was clearly demonstrated. Fixed
term workers enjoy a higher percentage of entitlement in these fringe
benefits: retirement pay (43.8% vs 0.1%); bonus payment (38.9% vs
0.1%); overtime allowance (31.0% vs 1.7%); and paid leave (34.5%
vs 01.%).
Another worrying trend is the rate of participation in social
insurance by non-regular workers which was only less than half
of that of regular employees. The participation rate of various
social insurance schemes by non-regular workers, which was on
the increase until 2004, began to decline in 2005. For national
pension participation rate, the rates of regular and non-regular
workers are 75.7% and 36.6%. For health insurance, the rates of
regular and non-regular workers are 75.9% and 37.7%. For
employment insurance, the gap was smaller with 63.8% of
regular workers and 34.5% of non-regular workers participating
(Table 6).
Table 6: Participation Rate of Social Insurance Schemes
by Type of Employment
Schemes
National
pension

Workers

Employment
insurance

August 2002 August 2003 August 2004 August 2005

Total wage workers 7,392 (52.7) 8,163 (57.7) 8,683 (59.5) 9,191 (61.4)
Regular
Non-regular

Health
insurance

Unit: 1,000 persons, %

6,405 (62.9) 6,757 (70.8) 6,659 (72.5) 7,184 (75.7)
987 (25.7) 1,405 (30.5) 2,024 (37.5) 2,008 (36.6)

Total wage workers 7,785 (55.5) 8,422 (59.5) 8,945 (61.3) 9,264 (61.9)
Regular

6,681 (65.6) 6,919 (72.5) 6,782 (73.8) 7,196 (75.9)

Non-Regular

1,105 (28.8) 1,504 (32.6) 2,163 (40.1) 2,068 (37.7)

Total wage workers 6,730 (48.0) 7,048 (49.8) 7,601 (52.1) 7,943 (53.1)
Regular

5,722 (56.2) 5,701 (59.7) 5,655 (61.5) 6,050 (63.8)

Non-regular

1,007 (26.2) 1,347 (29.2) 1,946 (36.1) 1,893 (34.5)

Source: Supplementary Survey of the Economically Active Population, various years.

SMEs and Non-Standard Employment
Results from the latest SEAPS also show that the share of
non-standard workers is much higher among the SMEs. 50.4% of
11

them were working in very small sized establishments with fewer
than 5 employees, while only 17% in establishment with 300
workers or more are non-standard workers (Ahn, 2004: 12). It is
already acknowledged that wages and benefits are less favourable in
the SMEs than in large enterprises.
The Policy Responses
Immediately following the financial crisis, the Korean government
adopted a variety of policies to address and ease the negative
impacts of flexible labour market reforms and the massive layoff.
The minimum wage law was extended to cover all workplaces in
2000. Beginning in July 2000, industrial accident compensation
insurance was available in all workplaces, regardless of size. The
protection of daily workers has been strengthened. They became
eligible for unemployment insurance in 2001. Measures have been
taken to expand the former Livelihood Protection Act, which was
enacted in 1961. The revision waived the eligibility criteria of an
asset check, in order to give protection to those who are unemployed
but not eligible for unemployment benefits. As well as strengthening
its roles of providing protection to the people, the government also
strengthened the employment training and placement services, and
set up Job Centres nationwide.
The overall goals of the policy responses were to strengthen the
flexibility of labour market, in terms of functional, skills, and
numerical flexibility, while, at the same time, protecting a workforce
that is facing an economic downturn, industrial restructuring, layoffs,
and high unemployment rates. These goals were reflected in the
two-pronged reforms adopted by Korean government that attempted
to tackle the crisis and achieve a balanced development among
political democratization, economic reforms, and social development
- described by the term ‘Productive Welfare’.
The Tripartite Commission set up the ‘Special Committee on
Measures for Non-regular Workers’ in 2001 and eventually agreed
on the following items in principle: to improve the measures to
determine the size and scope of non-regular workers and relevant
12

statistics; reinforcement of labour inspection; expansion of social
insurance coverage; and expansion of vocational ability
development.
The Commission also reached a Social Pact for Job Creation on
December 2003; and the Agreement on Vocational Training for
SMEs and Non-regular Workers in March 2005. The participating
parties call for actions to narrow the gap in working conditions by
asking the large companies not to transfer their own labour cost to
their subcontractors without justifiable reasons; business not to
unfairly discriminate against non-regular workers; improvement of
vocational ability programmes; and the government to take active
measures to redress unfair discrimination between standard and
non-standard workers.
The current Roh government declared the protection of non-standard
workers from abuse and discriminatory treatment as its labour
market policy basic principles, while accepting the existence and
function of non-standard employment. The most controversial step
was the new bill – ‘The Act on the Protection of Fixed Term and
Part-time Employees’ and amendment to the ‘Act on the Protection
of Dispatch Employees’, presented to the National Assembly in
November 2004.
The main content of the bills include:
1. Unjustifiable discriminatory practices against workers with
fixed-term contracts, part-time employees and temporary agency
workers are prohibited.
2. Firms must establish a written contract when hiring fixed term
and part-time workers.
3. The maximum duration of fixed term contracts is extended from
one to three years (not applicable to aged 50 and above). Firms
cannot dismiss workers after three years of contract work, even
when their contract expires.
4. Overtime work by part-time employees is limited to 12 hours a
week.
13

5. The maximum period for employing temporary agency workers
is extended from two to three years (no maximum period for
aged 50 and above).
6. The use of temporary agency workers is expanded from 26
occupations at present to all occupations.
The government repeatedly argued that these bills could protect the
job security and improve the working conditions of non-standard
workers. Nevertheless, this proposal met with criticism from the
trade unions, employees and the opposition parties, and was
postponed repeatedly for decision at the National Assembly. The
trade unions argued that the bills would only increase the number of
non-standard workers and make their job status more unstable. They
called for equal treatment of regular and irregular workers.
The employers argued that the proposal would only make the labour
market more rigid. The Korea Employers Federation threatened the
government with a mass exodus of businesses if it continues to
favour trade unions (as a matter of fact, the overseas direct
investment has increased from USM$ 3,686 to USM$ 6,398 from
2002 to 2005). It insists that if salaries of non-regular workers are
raised by law to the level of regular workers’, businesses will have to
shoulder an additional W42.6 trillion (US$42.6 billion) in cost, of
which 93.2% will have to be borne by SMEs. The Federation’s
chairman, Lee Soo-young, warned that “If the government and
politicians favour only trade unions, as they do now, business people
will go on a strike. In other words, we will shut down and leave for
China, India and Bangladesh, which will result in a shrinking job
market and increasing unemployment”. (Chosun Ilbo, 10 February
2006)
The ongoing debate was also focused on the period that temporary
workers can be hired freely and the protection of them after that
period. Trade unions (e.g. KCTU) demanded the companies to hire
the temporary staff freely for one year (in some cases, two years),
and they should be converted as permanent staff after this. But, the
employers argued that companies should be allowed to hire
14

temporary workers for up to three years freely and then restricted in
laying off temporary workers after that. Though the government
proposed a compromise of two years in March 2006, the employers
say they cannot bear the burden of turning non-regular workers to
regular workers. (Korea Herald, 2 March 2006)
The latest effort by the government to get the bills passed through
the National Assembly was to promulgate the ‘5-Year Plan of
Comprehensive Measures for Non-Regular Workers’, making
promises to improve the protection, 1 if the National Assembly
passed at its extra-ordinary session last April. However, the bills
were once again postponed, this time due to opposition from the
Grand National Party.
The Dilemma of Reform and Protection
The use of non-standard workers may have its own merits both to
the employers and employees (though to a lesser extent the latter).
The use of non-standard workers can enable businesses to cope
flexibly with fluctuations in the market. The use of part-time
workers may also allow the workers to balance their own personal
needs and their work. The flexible labour reform has attempted to
modify the rather rigid labour market in Korea. The financial crisis
has helped to accelerate the reforms that could not be achieved
before 1997.
Nevertheless, flexible labour market policies have produced a more
uncertain employment prospect in Korea. The massive layoffs and
new employer-employee relationship have weakened the ties
between companies and employees and there is a lower level of
loyalty (Park & Yu, 2001, p. 2). Although the rising proportion of
non-regular workers helps to contain the labour costs and increases
employment flexibility, it has a negative impact on both equity and
efficiency over the long term due to polarization (Jones, 2005).
1

Including loan and extended benefit; expansion of the application of the Labor
Standards Act to enterprises with fewer than 4 employees and introduce the retirement
pension system in enterprises with fewer than 5 employees; promotion of healthy use
of non-regular workers if that fit to the workers’ need (e.g., child care) ; improve
unfair trade practices between contractors and subcontractors.
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While regular workers enjoy better protection, irregular workers are
increasingly in a vulnerable position (Choi, 2000). As revealed
above, a dual and segmented labour market has been formed, even
though the number of non-standard workers remains stable in the
past two to three years. The non-regular workers face a rather low
rate of moving to regular employment, i.e. 15%, compared to an
average of 30% in advanced OECD areas, and over 40% in Ireland,
Portugal and Denmark (Labor Today, Issue No.336, April 13, 2006).
As argued by Kim and Cheon, “regular workers in unionized
companies receive legal protection under the employment protection
laws and the internal labour market practices of corporations. On the
other hand, the turnover rate for irregular workers and employees of
small and medium sized companies is getting very high and their
wages respond sensitively to economic situations” (2004:4). They
concluded that flexibility in Korea was achieved not by reforms in
legal mechanisms, but by the wider utilization of irregular workers.
An assessment by the IMD and the World Economic Forum on the
formal legal and regulatory framework showed that the labour
regulations and hiring and firing practices in Korea have in fact been
becoming more rigid from 2000 to 2003 (Table 7)
Table 7: IMD and World Economic Forum Assessment of Flexibility in Korea
Year

Labour regulations (1)

Hiring and Firing Practices (2)

2000
2001
2002
2003

4.57
4.08
3.74
2.61

-4.0
3.8
3.6

(1) 0 = not flexible enough; 10 = flexible enough
(2) 1 = impeded by regulations; 7 = flexibly determined by employers
Source: Kim & Cheon, 2004: 9-10

The current government’s move to enact the bill on protecting
irregular workers reflects the reality of having more and more
unprotected non-standard, fixed term contract workers in Korea. Yet,
the difficulties of getting the bills passed in the past 19 months also
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reflects the deeply divided interests among the different stakeholders
on these issues.
Nevertheless, considering the increasingly global competition and
volatility of the market, a more flexible labour market in Korea is
preferable, even though at the expense of a stable employment.
While further relaxing the clause protecting the regular employees
seems unrealistic, at least in the coming years, to expand and
improve the protection for those who might face difficulties in the
uncertain labour market is desirable. Legislation against abusing
non-standard employment through repeated contracting, expanding
social insurance coverage, and rectifying unfair treatment (e.g. salary,
bonus, overtime allowance, etc.) are all necessary. The direction
might not be equalize the treatment, but at least to narrow down the
gap.
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